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INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT 
In its published opinion, the panel erroneously reached—and incorrectly 
resolved—a critical issue concerning the scope of the protection that section 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230, affords to website 
operators.  The panel’s opinion contravenes the language and policy of the CDA, 
conflicts with decisions of this and other courts, and creates potentially significant 
liabilities and burdens for a wide range of website operators.  Rehearing and 
rehearing en banc should be granted. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe, an aspiring model, created a profile on 
ModelMayhem.com, a networking site for models, make-up artists, stylists, and 
photographers run by Defendant-Appellee Internet Brands, Inc.  She seeks to hold 
Internet Brands liable for a horrific crime perpetrated by two men who contacted 
her “through ModelMayhem.com” and arranged a “fake audition” at which she 
was raped.  (Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 13.)  The district court dismissed the 
complaint as barred by the CDA, which preempts liability based on any “duty” that 
“derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker’” of 
“content provided by another,” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  (ER7-8.)   
In reversing, the panel committed two crucial errors.   
First, after Plaintiff at oral argument belatedly changed the complaint’s 
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factual theory, the court decided an unbriefed issue raised by Plaintiff’s improper 
de facto amendment.  Both Internet Brands and the district court explicitly 
understood Plaintiff’s allegation that the perpetrators contacted her “through 
ModelMayhem.com” (ER13, emphasis added) to mean that they communicated 
with her using the website.  But at argument, Plaintiff contended for the first time 
that the men instead contacted her “outside the website,” using contact information 
she had posted on her profile.  The panel should not have allowed Plaintiff’s 
belated shift, which contravenes the settled rule that a party “‘may not try to amend 
[its] complaint through [its] arguments on appeal.’”  Ecological Rights Found. v. 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 511 (9th Cir. 2013).  And even if the 
change is allowed, the proper course would be to vacate the judgment and remand 
for the filing of an amended complaint and a new motion to dismiss. 
Second, the panel incorrectly resolved the critical issue raised by Plaintiff’s 
about-face, i.e., whether the CDA barred Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that it 
sought to hold Internet Brands liable for acting “as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
user content by hosting [Plaintiff’s] user profile.”  (Op. 11, emphasis added.)  In 
answering that question in the negative, the panel mistakenly focused only on 
causation and held that the but-for causal role played by Internet Brands’ 
publication of Plaintiff’s profile was not enough to trigger the CDA.  (Op. 12.)  
The panel overlooked the fact that the separate element of “duty” here “derives 
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from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’”  Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1102.  Specifically, Plaintiff’s claim that she had a “special relationship” 
with Internet Brands giving rise to a duty to warn rests critically on the allegation 
that Internet Brands published Plaintiff’s profile.  The panel’s erroneous holding 
conflicts with every decision addressing a comparable claim, contravenes the 
CDA’s purposes, and threatens significantly to expand the potential scope of 
liability for website operators.   
BACKGROUND 
I. Plaintiff’s Complaint 
Plaintiff alleges that, in February 2011, she was contacted “through 
ModelMayhem.com” by a person fraudulently posing as a “talent scout.”  (ER13.)  
When Plaintiff arrived for a “fake audition” in Florida, the men conducting the 
“audition” (Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum) surreptitiously drugged 
Plaintiff, after which Callum raped her while Flanders videotaped it.  (ER13-14.)  
The men then marketed the videotape as pornography.  (Id.) 
Plaintiff alleges that, prior to this assault, Internet Brands was aware that 
Flanders and Callum had “used ModelMayhem.com to lure other users in this 
sexual battery scheme,” and that it therefore had a duty to “warn Plaintiff[] and 
other ModelMayhem.com users.”  (ER11, 17.)  Internet Brands’ alleged 
knowledge arose only from its awareness, “no later than August 2010,” that in 
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2007 Flanders and Callum had been “arrested and charged with luring and 
victimizing at least five women.”  (ER15.)1  Plaintiff does not allege any facts 
showing that Internet Brands was aware, in 2011, that the men had brazenly 
resumed their criminal scheme while being prosecuted by the State of Florida.  
United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (after their 2007 
state arrests, the two men “were released on bond and continued their scheme until 
their [federal] arrests in 2011”).  The state case was later dropped in favor of a 
federal prosecution that resulted in life sentences for both men.  Id. at 1341-42.   
II. The District Court’s Dismissal 
In moving to dismiss, Internet Brands noted that it had to take as true 
Plaintiff’s allegation that Flanders and Callum contacted her “through” 
ModelMayhem.com.  (Clerk’s Record (“CR”) 12 at 1; ER13.)  Parenthetically, 
however, Internet Brands explained that it believed this allegation to be false:  its 
understanding of the true facts was that Plaintiff “post[ed] her personal contact 
information” on ModelMayhem.com—which the website cautioned against 
doing—and that she “was contacted directly by her assailants,” who obtained her 
contact information from her profile.  (CR26 at 2 n.1 & 5 n.11.)  But accepting 
Plaintiff’s allegation that “the communication occurred through the [w]ebsite” (id. 
                                           
1 Plaintiff alleges that, in August 2010, Internet Brands sued the prior owner of 
ModelMayhem.com, who failed to disclose Flanders’ and Callum’s pre-arrest 
crimes when the company was sold to Internet Brands in 2008.  (ER15-16.) 
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at 5 n.11), Internet Brands argued that the complaint was plainly barred by section 
230 under Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008), and Julie Doe 
II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2009).  (CR12 at 3-5; CR26 at 2-5.)  
Plaintiff’s opposition did not explicitly disavow this understanding of her 
complaint, arguing instead that, in her view, it was irrelevant what communications 
“Internet Brands may or may not have allowed or ‘published’ on its 
modelmayhem.com website.”  (CR22 at 11.)   
The district court granted the motion to dismiss.  (ER5.)  The court 
confirmed its similar understanding of the complaint, noting there was no “dispute 
that the ‘information content’ was provided by another ‘information content 
provider,’” i.e., the perpetrators.  (ER7; see also ER8 (Plaintiff’s theory rested on 
“risks associated with content provided by third parties”).)  Plaintiff’s theory was 
“barred by the CDA,” the court held, because the alleged duty to warn “derives 
solely from [Internet Brands’] status as a publisher of that content.”  (ER8.)2 
III. The Panel’s Opinion 
Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (“POB”) again argued that her failure-to-warn 
theory “has nothing to do with communications or content that Internet Brands 
may or may not have allowed or ‘published’ on its modelmayhem.com website.”  
                                           
2 The district court did not address the parties’ arguments as to whether California 
law imposed a duty to warn and whether Plaintiff had pleaded proximate causation.  
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(POB25.)  Although Plaintiff also vaguely stated that “Flanders and Callum are not 
alleged to be responsible for any content on modelmayhem.com” (POB29, 
emphasis added), it was not until oral argument that Plaintiff first claimed that the 
men never communicated with Plaintiff through ModelMayhem.com.  When asked 
whether Plaintiff responded to a posting by the perpetrators, Plaintiff’s counsel 
stated that this was “not correct” and that Plaintiff instead contended that, after she 
“posted her information on the website,” the “perps then contacted [her] outside 
the website, frankly.”  (http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id= 
0000012268 (“Oral arg.”) at time-stamp 4:24-4:39.)   
In its opinion, the panel stated that it understood Plaintiff’s failure-to-warn 
claim as not resting upon any allegation “that Model Mayhem transmitted any 
potentially harmful messages between [Plaintiff] and Flanders or Callum” or that 
the men had otherwise “posted anything themselves.”  (Op. 8, 11.)  Based on this 
understanding, the panel held that Plaintiff did not “seek to hold Internet Brands 
liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of content someone posted on the Model Mayhem 
website” (Op. 8), and that the CDA did not apply.  (Op. 12-13.)   
The panel also briefly addressed, and rejected, the view that the CDA 
preempted Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that Internet Brands’ alleged liability 
rested upon Defendant being deemed “the ‘publisher or speaker’ of user content by 
hosting Jane Doe’s user profile.”  (Op. 11, emphasis added.)   
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REASONS WHY REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED 
I. The Panel Erred by Allowing Plaintiff Effectively to Amend Her 
Complaint on Appeal and Deciding an Unbriefed Issue Raised Thereby 
Plaintiff’s belated effort to amend her factual allegations at oral argument 
should have been rejected, and the panel should have affirmed based on the 
parties’ and the district court’s clearly stated understanding of the complaint.  At 
the very least, the panel should have vacated the judgment and remanded for filing 
of an amended complaint and a new motion to dismiss. 
In moving to dismiss, Internet Brands went out of its way to ensure that it 
correctly understood Plaintiff’s allegations.  Because Plaintiff alleged that the 
perpetrators contacted her “through ModelMayhem.com” (ER13), Internet Brands 
understood Plaintiff to allege that they had communicated with her on the 
website—an allegation that Internet Brands explicitly said it believed to be false 
but was required to accept as true.  See supra at 4-5.  The district court likewise 
expressly construed the complaint as alleging that the perpetrators had 
communicated with Plaintiff by posting content on ModelMayhem.com.  See supra 
at 5.  Plaintiff never informed Internet Brands or the district court that they had 
misapprehended the complaint, and she therefore waived any such argument.  
George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2013).  Nor did Plaintiff seek leave 
to amend, either before or after the court’s ruling.  Vincent v. Trend Western Tech. 
Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 1987) (absent request to amend, plaintiff could 
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not raise new theory “for the first time on appeal”).  By contending for the first 
time at appellate oral argument that the complaint’s allegation of a contact 
“through ModelMayhem.com” had been misconstrued, Plaintiff improperly sought 
to amend the complaint on appeal.  Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 511. 
Accordingly, the only argument Plaintiff properly preserved for appeal was 
her contention that, even assuming the perpetrators contacted her through 
ModelMayhem.com, her failure-to-warn theory escapes the immunity provided by 
the CDA.  The district court correctly rejected this argument.  (ER7-8.)  If Plaintiff 
was contacted through ModelMayhem.com, then the risk that allegedly gave rise to 
Internet Brands’ duty to warn is inescapably a “risk[] associated with content 
provided by third parties on its website,” and Plaintiff therefore clearly seeks to 
hold Internet Brands liable for injuries arising from publishing such content.  
(ER8.)  The CDA bars such a claim, as courts consistently have held.  Jane Doe, 
528 F.3d at 420; Julie Doe, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 573.  Nothing in the panel’s 
opinion suggests that, if the communications had occurred on the Defendant’s 
website (as in Jane Doe and Julie Doe), the panel would have split with those 
decisions.  Because the only theory Plaintiff preserved for appeal fails, the 
judgment should have been affirmed. 
At the very least, if Plaintiff is allowed to shift positions, the proper course 
would be to vacate the judgment and remand for filing of an amended complaint 
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and a new motion to dismiss.  As the panel recognized, Plaintiff’s belated 
contention that the perpetrators never contacted her through ModelMayhem.com 
raises the distinct issue whether section 230 would nonetheless apply because 
Internet Brands was “act[ing] as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of user content by 
hosting [Plaintiff’s] user profile.”  (Op.11, emphasis added.)  Internet Brands 
respectfully submits that the panel resolved that issue incorrectly, see infra at 9-18, 
but the critical threshold point is that the panel should not have decided this 
discrete issue, which was never briefed by the parties.  The panel should have 
remanded the case rather than “‘decide ab initio issues that the district court has 
not had an opportunity to consider[.]’”  Merritt v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 
F.3d 1023, 1040 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Galvan v. Alaska Dep’t of Corr., 397 
F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2005) (reaching unbriefed issue raises fairness concerns). 
II. The Panel Erred in Holding That Publication of Subscriber Content Is 
Insufficient to Trigger the CDA’s Immunity 
The panel erred in holding that the CDA’s immunity was not triggered by 
Plaintiff’s reliance upon Internet Brands’ status “as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
user content by hosting [Plaintiff’s] user profile.”  (Op. 11.)   
A. The Panel Overlooked That Internet Brands’ Alleged Duty to 
Warn Rests Critically on Its Publishing of Plaintiff’s Third-Party 
Content—Her Profile 
In holding that Internet Brands’ publication of Plaintiff’s third-party content 
did not trigger the CDA, the panel concluded that this “[p]ublishing activity” was 
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at best merely a “‘but-for cause’” of Plaintiff’s injuries.  (Op. 11-12.)  But in 
addressing only causation, the panel overlooked that the alleged duty here is 
unavoidably based on Internet Brands’ status as publisher of Plaintiff’s profile.   
Section 230 states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider,” and it expressly preempts any state-law 
liability “that is inconsistent with this section.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (e)(3).  
There is no dispute that Internet Brands is the “provider” of “an interactive 
computer service,” or that Plaintiff’s posting of her profile makes her an 
“information content provider.”  Id., § 230(f)(2)-(3) (defining these terms).  The 
only question, then, is “whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant 
violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’  
If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.  
Internet Brands denies that California law imposes a duty to warn here, but that 
issue is not before the Court.  Plaintiff’s briefs, however, make clear that the duty 
she alleges is one that derives from Internet Brands’ status as the “publisher” of her 
profile.  Id. 
Plaintiff relies on California law “impos[ing] a duty to warn a potential 
victim of third party harm when a person has a ‘special relationship to … the 
foreseeable victim[.]’”  (Op. 6.)  Plaintiff invokes Restatement section 314A (see 
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Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (“PRB”) 11 & n.4), which lists various special relationships 
(such as innkeeper-guest) and which also requires that “the risk of harm, or of 
further harm, arise[] in the course of that relation.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 314A, cmt. c.  Thus, Internet Brands could conceivably have had a duty to 
warn only if (1) it had a “special relationship” with Plaintiff; and (2) the particular 
risk at issue arose within the scope of that relationship.  Here, any argument 
concerning these two elements rests on Internet Brands’ status as publisher of 
Plaintiff’s content. 
Plaintiff cites no precedent recognizing a “special relationship” in any 
comparable context and instead relies on an analogy to a “business possessor of 
land” and an “invitee” onto that land.  (PRB11-12 & n.4.)  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND), § 314A(3).  The “land” at issue here, under this analogy, is 
“ModelMayhem.com,” and Plaintiff was “invited” onto that site only through 
Internet Brands’ agreement to publish her user content.  More generally, any 
inquiry into whether a “special relationship” exists requires an examination of the 
nature of the relationship, including the services provided that allegedly give rise to 
the duty.  See, e.g., Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 
193, 200 (1984) (“By contracting with the business to provide security services, 
the security guard creates a special relationship [with] the business’s customers.”).  
Here, any argument that Internet Brands has a special relationship with Plaintiff 
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necessarily rests on the content-publishing services it provided to Plaintiff.3   
Likewise, any argument that the risk at issue here arose within the scope of 
the alleged special relationship unavoidably rests on Internet Brands’ status as 
publisher of Plaintiff’s content.  The scope of any special-relationship duty is 
bounded by the “confines of the relationship and does not extend to other risks.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 40, 
cmt. f; see also McGettigan v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 57 Cal. App. 4th 1011, 
1018 (1997) (under § 314A, duty arises “only where the special relationship exists 
between the parties and the risk of harm arises in the course of that relation”).  
Here, the only thing that arguably ties the particular risk (assaults by persons such 
as Callum and Flanders) to Internet Brands’ relationship with Plaintiff is the fact 
that Internet Brands publishes Plaintiff’s content on the Internet, where it might 
then be seen by such perpetrators.  Indeed, Plaintiff conceded at oral argument that, 
under her theory, it is the publishing of Plaintiff’s profile which “create[d] the risk” 
of harm.  (Oral arg. at time stamp 12:13-12:26.)       
Because any argument that Internet Brands had a duty to Plaintiff 
ineluctably “derives from [its] status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker,’” the 
CDA “precludes liability.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.   
                                           
3 Contrary to what Plaintiff suggests (POB22-23), “knowledge of the danger[] is 
insufficient to create a legally cognizable special relationship[.]”  Nally v. Grace 
Community Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 297 (1988).   
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B. The Panel’s Decision Conflicts With Settled Case Law 
Every prior court to consider the issue has held that a website operator’s 
publication of a user’s profile or contact information—be it the victim’s, or the 
perpetrator’s—is sufficient to trigger the CDA’s protections.   
In Jane Doe v. MySpace, the plaintiffs (a minor and her mother) sued 
MySpace after the minor was assaulted by a man she met on the site and with 
whom she had shared her contact information.  Similar to Plaintiff here, the 
plaintiffs argued they were not attacking the defendant’s publishing decisions, but 
only its failure to exclude minors and to keep predators from using the site to 
communicate with minors.  528 F.3d at 416-19.  Quoting the district court’s 
decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the CDA applied:  
“[T]he underlying basis of Plaintiffs’ claims is that, through postings 
on MySpace, [perpetrator] and [the minor] met and exchanged 
personal information which eventually led to an in-person meeting 
and the sexual assault….  If MySpace had not published 
communications between [the minor] and [perpetrator], including 
personal contact information, Plaintiffs assert they never would have 
met and the sexual assault never would have occurred.  No matter 
how artfully Plaintiffs seek to plead their claims, the Court views 
Plaintiffs’ claims as directed toward MySpace in its publishing, 
editorial, and/or screening capacities.” 
Id. at 419-20 (quoting 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (W.D. Tex. 2007)) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 420 (minor plaintiff “created the content” and “disclos[ed] 
personal information”); 474 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (holding that both plaintiff and 
perpetrator “qualify as ‘information content providers’”).   
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Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on 
other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008), reached a similar conclusion.  There, 
the plaintiff met on the defendant’s website, and later had sex with, an underage 
user who falsely had claimed to be an adult.  502 F. Supp. 2d at 722.  After the 
plaintiff’s arrest, he sued the website for, inter alia, failure to warn and negligent 
misrepresentation.  Id. at 722-24.  The district court dismissed the claims under the 
CDA: 
… Plaintiff is seeking to hold SexSearch liable for its publication of 
third-party content and harms flowing from the dissemination of that 
content.  The underlying basis for Plaintiff’s claim is that if SexSearch 
had never published Jane Roe’s profile, Plaintiff and Jane Roe never 
would have met, and the sexual encounter never would have taken 
place.   
Id. at 727 (emphasis added); see also Beckman v. Match.com, 2013 WL 2355512, 
at *5 (D. Nev. May 29, 2013), appeal pending, No. 13-16324 (9th Cir.) (rejecting 
failure-to-warn and other claims arising from assault by person plaintiff met on 
Match.com; the “conduct of publishing a user’s profile is within the ambit of 
protection afforded under the CDA as these claims challenge Match.com’s role as 
a publisher of third party content”); cf. Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, 
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (website’s publication of 
member’s potentially discriminatory comments on member’s profile triggered 
CDA immunity).  
By holding that the CDA does not bar Plaintiff’s effort to hold Internet 
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Brands liable for harms flowing from its publication of Plaintiff’s profile, the 
panel’s opinion conflicts with settled case law.   
C. The Panel’s Decision Too Narrowly Construed the Policies Behind 
the CDA and Could Significantly Impact Website Operators 
The panel’s decision also contravenes Congress’s purposes in enacting 
section 230 in that it threatens to chill the free exchange of information on the 
Internet and could significantly increase potential liabilities and burdens for a wide 
range of website operators.   
Congress recognized that liability-driven incentives for website operators to 
screen enormous volumes of third-party content before posting it could encourage 
widespread refusals to post user-generated content, thereby impairing the Internet’s 
ability to serve as a “forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).  Accordingly, “to promote the free exchange of 
information and ideas over the Internet,” Congress established a broad prohibition 
on liability arising from publication of another’s content.  Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(1)-(2) (CDA’s stated purposes include “promot[ing] the continued 
development of the Internet” and “preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet”).   
These policies are squarely implicated here.  If website operators must worry 
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about whether publication of other persons’ content could give rise to duties to 
warn them about the dangers they might encounter by virtue of that content, many 
operators may choose to limit or even eliminate such content.  Moreover, by 
denying CDA immunity, the panel’s decision leaves all social and professional 
networking sites extremely vulnerable as more users share contact information 
online.  Recent studies indicate that 20% of younger users post their cellphone 
number online, and nearly half of all Internet users report that their email addresses 
are posted online.4  Given that 25% of Internet users reported seeing someone 
physically threatened online; 8% experienced such threats themselves; and 8% 
reported being stalked online, the volume of threats that might give rise to a duty to 
warn is substantial.5  And if, as Plaintiff contends, the duty to warn continues for 
years after the perpetrator’s arrest, the potential liability from profile-publication 
could be staggering. 
The panel nonetheless held that the CDA’s “core policy” is to allow 
websites freely “to edit or remove user generated content” and that this policy is 
inapplicable here because the implementation of a warning would not require any 
                                           
4 Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, Pew Research (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/05/21/teens-social-media-and-privacy/; 
Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, Pew Research (Sept. 5, 2013),  
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/.   
5 Online Harrassment, Pew Research (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
2014/10/22/online-harassment/. 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????




such editing but only a posting by “Internet Brands itself.”  (Op. 9-10.)  This 
overlooks that Internet Brands might have avoided triggering any asserted duty to 
warn here by editing Plaintiff’s profile to delete her contact information, thereby 
limiting any initial contacts with ModelMayhem.com members to communications 
within the website.  Moreover, the policies behind the CDA are implicated, not 
only in cases of compelled editing, but whenever the “duty … derives from the 
defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker’” of “content provided by 
another,” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102 (emphasis added).  In any such case, the 
“posting of information … would be chilled” by imposing liability.  Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003).  And the “free exchange of 
information and ideas over the Internet,” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122, would not be 
fostered by requiring that the posting of social-networking profiles be coupled with 
years’ worth of specific warnings about innumerable dangers that users may face.   
The panel held that the statute only sought to “‘avoid the chilling effect upon 
Internet free speech’” that might arise from imposing liability for carrying 
“‘potentially harmful messages,’” but that no such messages were at issue here.  
(Op. 10-11, emphasis added.)  However, this narrow focus is misplaced, because 
nothing in the CDA suggests that its protection extends only to the publication of 
inherently harmful messages.  As this Court explained in Barnes, although the 
“cause of action most frequently associated” with section 230 “is defamation,” a 
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“‘law’s scope often differs from its genesis,’” and here the CDA’s language also 
extends to claims “premised on the publication or speaking of what one might call 
‘information content.’”  570 F.3d at 1101.  Indeed, courts have repeatedly held that 
section 230’s immunity applies even if the communications at issue were not 
themselves harmful.  See, e.g., Julie Doe, 175 Cal. App. 4th at 573 (rejecting the 
“false distinction between tortious information and harmless communications,” 
noting it was inconsistent with multiple cases); see also Jane Doe, 528 F.3d at 416, 
421 (CDA applied notwithstanding that plaintiff and perpetrator “communicated 
offline” after plaintiff “provided her telephone number,” and plaintiff was “‘not 
complaining about any of the content that was transmitted between’” them).  
Accordingly, the panel erred in narrowly reading the policies behind the CDA and 
concluding that they did not apply here based on a false distinction between 
informational and harmful messages and on an incorrect belief that imposing 
liability on informational messages would not have the same chilling effect upon 
Internet free speech that the CDA sought to prevent. 
CONCLUSION 
Rehearing and rehearing en banc should be granted.   
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